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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Area 
 
 In the European Parliament elections of May 2014, right-wing parties' influence on 
politics reached new heights. There are countries where nationalist policies have won over 
voters with a majority of more than one out of four votes. These parties are, for instance, 
Front National in France, whose leader Marine le Pen gained 25% of the votes, increasing the 
party's influence from three seats to 23 (europedecides 2014). Another country where the 
emergence of a nationalist party has become more prominent, is Denmark. Here, Dansk 
Folkeparti (the Danish People's Party) has stood out with its critical attitude towards two key 
issues; the Unified Patent Court and the recent influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe. As 
well as other policies, this has led to an increase in popularity. As a result, the Danish 
People's Party, has become the biggest political party in Denmark, gaining 26,6% of the votes 
(europedecides 2014).  
 In the UK, which is the focus of this project, the UK Independence Party received 
support from 27.5% of the people, which in turn, also led to it becoming the largest party 
(UKIP 2014). UKIP is one of the key right-wing political parties in the UK, as well as the 
Conservatives and the British National Party (BNP). Both UKIP and the BNP are extreme 
right-wing parties, however, we have chosen to base our project on UKIP, seeing as the BNP 
have not risen in popularity.  
 In relation to Norris' theory, we have chosen a few significant factors ,which we find 
may be relevant in the rise of UKIP. Euroscepticism, xenophobia and immigration are three 
of many of the contributing variables we will examine. Since UKIP is based on xenophobia, 
and the majority of its main policies are critical towards the EU and the issue of immigration 
in the UK,  we are sure that there is an interrelation to be found. Throughout this project, we 
will aim to illustrate that there is causality between the factors we have just identified and 
UKIP's rise in political influence.     
 We had groups we would have liked to focus on, such as the English Defence League 
(EDL) and the British National Party (BNP), though, in the end, we decided to put the main 
focus on UKIP. This is due to the recent European Parliament (EP) election, where UKIP 
received massive support, and as a result gained the majority vote with 27.5% of the votes. 
  
3 
UKIP now represents Britain with 24 seats in the EP; an increase of 11 seats in comparison to 
the 2009 election (europedecides 2014). In light of other right-wing parties in the UK - such 
as BNP ,which only received a mere 1.1% of votes in the 2014 elections - it is apparent that  
UKIP is the most influential one. This is exemplified graphically in the table below. 
 
Figure 1: National Election in Britain - Voting Statistics (2014) 
 
 As discussed in the previous paragraph, this project will concentrate on UKIP; 
Britain’s most influential right-wing party. Eurosceptic factors, which contribute to the rise in 
popularity of UKIP, will also play a role in our research.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
   
After careful consideration, we have decided upon the following research question;  
 
‘What are the main factors leading to the rise in popularity of the UK Independence Party?' 
  
 The key sociological theory of this project will be based on Pippa Norris’s notion of 
supply and demand (Norris 2005: 18). In short, Norris’s theory accounts for the relationship 
between policy makers and public opinion. Further on in the ‘Clarification of Concepts’ part, 
specific terms in accordance with this theory will be outlined and explained.   
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In order to help us answer our research question ‘What are the main factors leading to the 
rise in popularity of the UK Independence Party (UKIP),’ we will use the following sub-
questions.  
 
1. What are the factors constraining UKIP within Britain's electoral system? 
2. How is public demand reflected in UKIP policies regarding immigration and the EU?  
3. How does UKIP attempt to act according to populism?  
4. Why has UKIP been far more successful in European Parliament elections than in national 
general elections and polls?  
 
 1.3 Background information on UKIP 
 
This part seeks to introduce UKIP’s background and its political mobility. It will give 
the reader an insight into UKIP's role in British politics, how it was first established and what 
methods it has used to mobilise its supporters.  
Alan Sked, a history professor at the London School of Economics was the founder of 
the Anti-Federalist League (AFL) back in 1991. The party used to be known for its 
opposition towards the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty was signed by twelve countries in order 
to build a mutual economic and monetary unity. However, the group was very short-lived and 
it became what is now called the United Kingdom Independence Party or UKIP as they are 
more commonly referred to.  
UKIP was founded in 1993 by the key members of the AFL, which was a collection 
of scholars and politically aware enthusiasts. The party's main concern was the unnoticeable 
constitutional matters and as they were very unfamiliar to the political scene they struggled 
with running its campaign. Thus, miscommunication issues led to disputes amongst the 
members and due to inexperience the party found it hard to secure votes, as its main 
responsibility was on the separation of Europe, instead of acting according to populism. 
During its first ten years, UKIP was quite unknown in the political atmosphere and entered 
'25 parliamentary by-elections' (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 2) where they only ‘averaged’ an 
insignificant 1.7%. Moreover, since the group was unfamiliar to the public, when they were 
fortunate enough to gain media coverage, it was mostly negative branding UKIP as either 
beginners who did not know much about politics or a group leaning towards the extreme end 
of the political sphere. An article published in 1997 before UKIP’s appearance at the general 
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elections compared them to the 'Monster Raving Looney party, mocked the party as ‘a joke’ 
that had a ‘kamikaze approach’ to politics, and concluded UKIP were ‘doomed to spend 
their lives on the fringe of politics’' (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 2). Also, back in 2006 during a 
radio interview with Leading Britain’s Conversation (LBC) David Cameron referred to UKIP 
as ‘Fruit cakes’ and ‘closet racists’ (LBC, 2014). 
 The only time where UKIP ever influenced the debate in Britain was every five years, 
in the course of the European parliamentary elections, where its strong stance against the 
nation’s membership to the European Union (EU) grew into a public concern, however its 
achievement was brief and secluded, which Ford and Goodwin (2014) described as 'like a 
large angry bear, UKIP would stumble out of hibernation once every few years, briefly stir 
up popular discontent with Brussels and Westminster political elites, and then return to their 
slumbers' (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 2). It was as if they would act in order to interest and 
distract voters and journalist in dull European Parliament campaigns, yet back on the British 
political scene they tended to become unmemorable. Therefore, UKIP was a political group 
that originally was not taken seriously as it constantly showed rawness, and for the reason of 
its single- minded subject regarding the departure of the EU it was often criticised and 
compared to the 'Poujadist movement in France ,which in the 1950s had briefly united 
coalition of anti-establishment voters against high taxes and seemingly out-of-touch elites' 
(Ford and Goodwin 2014: 3). They too had a tendency to rise to the challenges however not 
long after had major downfalls.  
Through the years UKIP have slightly matured, gained more experience and expanded 
on its policies, which they chose to tackle by looking at groups, which they felt were side-
lined by the current or mainstream governments, whose concerns were not raised. With this 
in mind and its main policy to leave the EU they started to become more popular and gain 
recognition for its efforts. Although it seemed that UKIP had more of an influence when it 
came to the European Parliament elections as they continuously won voters, in 1994 they had 
1%, ten years later in 2004 it was 16%, which landed them in third place moving the Liberal 
Democrats down to fourth place (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011). In 2009 they came in 
second place with 16.5% thus pushing Labour into third place and as of this year 2014 UKIP 
managed to secure first place with 27.5% beating both the Conservatives and Labours party 
thus made history by winning (Wintour and Watt 2014). Looking at the result it is clear to see 
UKIP has come a long way from when they first began. They are more than what they were 
previously branded and extremely underestimated, now they are taken more seriously as they 
have become more organised and determined on its long-term goals. 
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1.4 Clarification of concepts 
Globalisation: This multifaceted phenomenon arose, giving way to a more interlinked global 
society. It is a process, whereby economies and cultures have become more integrated as a 
result of developments in trade and communication. Professors Anthony Elliott and John 
Urry describe the course of globalisation as an entity, which involves 'massive changes to the 
very fabric of routine personal, social and economic life (Elliott & 2010: 87-90).' 
 
Xenophobia: This is categorised as a form of discrimination and permeates the entirety of 
our project. In short, it is the irrational fear of anyone or anything that is perceived to be 
slightly unusual or foreign. Yakusko defines xenophobia as '…an underlying set of attitudes 
based on fear, dislike, or hatred of foreigners (Yakusko 2009: 37).'  
 
Cultural protectionism: The feeling of a need to protect your national culture. This is a 
notion seeking to describe the feeling among people who fear their country is being 'taken 
over' by immigrants and borders are being torn down, physically and culturally due to 
globalisation.  
 
Euroscepticism: The notion of Euroscepticism in this project is used to describe the critical 
opinions towards the EU system as a whole. Parties who practise Euroscepticism have a 
general negative approach to the EU, often wanting to return to a union only built on trade 
instead of a political union. 
 
Populism: A system in which policies are made to fit public opinion. Populism is often based 
on easy well-formulated solutions to more complex societal issues. Minor problems are often 
amplified and conversely solutions are simplified and sculpted to fit in with popular opinion. 
Explanations for the success of populism have invariably pointed out that populism is a 
reaction to modernisation and globalisation (Akkerman 2012: 1358).  
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Chapter 2 - Methods and Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter seeks to give an awareness of what is to be presented in the following 
paper. This section will give a detailed description of the methods and methodology, which 
entails both the empirical data that will be used and our selection of theory. It will then go on 
to explain our reasons for choosing UKIP as a case study for our project, all in hope of 
answering our research question. By the end of this, our reader should have a comprehension 
of the methods that we will be using during this process and how we intend to answer each 
sub-question as a tool to answer our overarching research question. 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
 This section will contain the methods that will be used: firstly, we are taking a 
descriptive approach to explain the secondary quantitative and qualitative data that we have 
chosen. The quantitative data consists of the statistics and numerical data that will be used 
throughout the project, for example surveys, voting patterns and questionnaires. The 
qualitative data that will be used will look at various literatures such as, books, journals and 
other academic writing and research. Speeches and interviews made by UKIP and the 
individuals that represent it e.g. Nigel Farage, the current party leader, will be analysed in 
respect to how his personality is gaining voters for his party. We will be using these 
approaches to explain the phenomenon of the growing popularity of the party. What we hope 
to gain from this is knowledge and a better grasp of what UKIP’s main driving forces are. 
Our aim is to articulate our understanding in a reasonable manner so that the readers of the 
project will acquire the same level of interpretation as we have developed during this process. 
 Our project will look at how UKIP makes itself stand out in relations to the other far 
right movements that are present in the British political arena. This is the reason as to why we 
are curious to finding out, which groups of people tend to vote for it and if there are any 
specific factors that leads them to this support. We have chosen UKIP as our case study, 
because we have noticed that since its establishment, it has gained many supporters, which 
had led them into coming second place in the European Parliament elections back in 2009 
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(Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012). We aim to answer our research question by using certain 
theoretical approaches, in order to give us a better, more in depth understanding of the 
phenomena at play.  
We will mainly focus on Pippa Norris' (2005) theory on radical right parties from her 
book 'Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market', since we believe that her 
method is the most effective when it comes to explanations for the popularity of right-wing 
parties. Although this theory fails to mention other aspects that can affect this change, we will 
also base our arguments on additional theories. Prior knowledge gathered in sociology and 
political science classes will be used to aid our writing process.  
 
2.3 Use of Empirical Data 
 
 This report uses a number of different empirical materials from secondary sources 
such as books and journals that will give an insight into the subject area and that relates 
specifically to UKIP or the rise of right-wing parties. We have structured the project in order 
and have researched extensive aspects that will be used to help us gain a conclusion so that 
readers find it easy to identify what we are aiming to confirm. For example, UKIP’s webpage 
contains all its party's information, its policies, local and European manifestos etc which will 
be very useful in trying to characterise why it holds the values that it does and what it intends 
to do if elected into power. As this material is available to the public for easy access, it is 
important to clarify that UKIP only posts what it wants the public to know; as a result, we 
cannot argue for how it is influenced when making its policies if it has not stated it in the 
resources provided. Articles, interviews and speeches linked to the party will be used in the 
analysis chapter in order to get a deeper understanding of it and what it represents. 
 Considerable amounts of secondary quantitative data will help answer our research 
question. We shall use various means of surveys and data that has been collected by agencies 
for example, YouGov in order to connect the numbers into the context that they are provided 
in and the manner ,which they are presented. It should be stated that all the materials that we 
will be using will be in the form of secondary sources as we do not have the means or 
capacity to conduct the research ourselves. Furthermore, since our focus area is based on a 
country other than Denmark, we are not able to produce surveys and interviews to get the 
public’s opinions on the subject matter. For this reason, we must rely on data that has already 
been carried out and verified.  
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2.4 Delimitation of Field Research  
 
In order to ensure that we are able to answer our final research question, it has been 
necessary to delimitate our field of research. Several interesting aspects of our initial project 
idea have been disregarded, seeing as they were not seen as being suitable enough as the 
project developed.  
Often abbreviated as ‘the EDL’, The English Defence League is a right-wing 
movement, whose unforeseen development in June 2009 took Britain by storm. In line with 
the EDL’s mission statement, the street organisation has two primary purposes: to draw 
public attention to the increasing threat of Islamic extremism in the UK and to, in turn, 
eradicate such extremist tendencies from society altogether (englishdefenceleague 2014). 
Initially, we thought that the EDL would make for a particularly solid foundation for our 
project framework, since it incorporated both of our focal research areas; right-wing 
extremism and Muslims in Britain as a minority group. However, we later realised how our 
initial research question of ‘right-wing intuitions in the UK’ was too broad, and thus made the 
collective decision as a group to discount the EDL and concentrate solely on UKIP.  
The fact that our initial research question also centred around ‘minority groups in 
Britain’, rather than just the Muslim community, also proved problematic for the group, in 
terms of project structuring. Once again, the only way to solve this problem was to narrow 
down the research question to a further extent. In doing so, this relinquished us of the 
opportunity to study how Sikhs and other Asian sub-sections in Britain are affected by the 
presence of right-wing political parties. If we had chosen to include other minority groups, as 
well as the Muslim community, then we would have had the possibility to compare and 
contrast them with each other, in turn, being able to see ,which groups are most affected. An 
additional reason as to why we dismissed certain minority groups was based on the 
geographical location of them. In Britain, certain cities are very densely populated with 
Asians, whereas others are home to very few. Seeing as Muslims are the most widely spread 
and populous minority group found in Britain today - and that we wanted to choose Britain as 
our case study, rather than individual cities - we decided not to include them.  
As we continued to elaborate on the subject of the right-wing movements, the BNP 
was an obvious choice. The party and its well-known leader, Nick Griffin, have numerous 
times been accused of racism and for being too extreme. For this reason, BNP was not 
included in our project. Here the BNP lost its two seats in parliament gaining a mere 1.1% of 
the votes (europedecides 2014). Whereas the BNP has experienced a lack in influence and a 
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decrease in voters, UKIP has risen. Since this project’s purpose is to understand the rise in 
right-wing parties, the BNP simply has not risen.  
Our final step was to move the majority of our focus on UKIP, seeing as it seemed the 
most appropriate party to choose in relation to our problem area. Britain faces challenges 
regarding the integration of immigrants. This is a contributing factor in the rise of support for 
UKIP, albeit we do not consider it a major one. The challenges associated with racial 
integration are contributing factors in the rise of right-wing movements, although we do not 
value this equally. We aim to look at immigration as a whole and not just the lack of 
integration, yet it would have been interesting and relevant to look at. This is because, among 
other factors, a lack of integration has led to segregation between immigrants and white 
British people, racial tensions and violent confrontations. 
 
2.5 Selection of theory 
 
A range of theories will be discussed in order to give support to our main arguments. 
This project aims to explain two main factors as to why UKIP has increased in popularity. 
Firstly, we will explore what factors are constraining UKIP within Britain's electoral system. 
The theories of xenophobia and polarisation will also be included to demonstrate how UKIP 
uses these to promote its opinion on immigration. Additional theories, such as Populism and 
Euroscepticism will also be incorporated, seeing as they link in appropriately with the factors 
supporting the surge in voters for UKIP.   
In the search for fitting theories, we came across Pippa Norris’ ‘Understanding the 
rise of the Radical Right’. This theory aims to explain the role globalisation plays in the 
factors, which led to an increase in support of right-wing movements. For this reason, we 
have chosen to build our project upon the ideas of Pippa Norris. 
We have been searching for the correct theory to apply to this project in order to 
answer our research question. Different authors have been considered and we ended up 
agreeing on using the three level model theory by Pippa Norris for understanding right-wing 
politics. Norris’ theory is divided into three levels, namely demand, supply and electoral 
rules. It allows us to understand how UKIP managed to succeed in gaining voters in the past 
European election and at the moment, stand to gain 17% of votes (YouGov 2014). In 
addition, it gives us an overview of UKIP's strategy and how it sets out its political agendas. 
However, we will also make use of certain concepts ,which interrelate with Norris's theory in 
order to help clarify and restrict our findings. In conclusion, all of these concepts, together 
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with Norris' theory, will provide an account for why UKIP's task is to come up with 'supplies' 
for this 'demand,' in order to affect the electoral process. 
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Chapter 3 - Theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 When looking at the radical right, Pippa Norris suggests looking at a model consisting 
of three different levels. She argues that in order to understand the rise of radical right parties 
in Europe, one needs to look at the three aforementioned factors, supply, demand, electoral 
rules and more importantly how they interact within a nation. Her model builds upon various 
theories, to begin with, the distinction between supply/demand, first developed by Roger 
Eatwell (Norris 2004: 274). Here interaction is key. If one looks solely at demand-side factors 
like globalisation or economics, one simply misses the endogeneity of parties and mass 
society (Norris 2004: 11). Mainly because of political parties' ability to transform society 
through rhetoric and policies. Norris therefore argues that another level is needed to shed 
light on how parties and politicians react to and shape demand side factors (Norris 2004: 14). 
However, she argues, the two level model of supply/demand has limitations. Different 
countries have different legislatives, and therefore one needs to look at the 'regulated 
electoral marketplace' and how it influences the realm of politics (Norris 2004: 16). The idea 
is that demand and supply work under the constraints of both formal and informal legislatives 
of a certain country (Norris 2004: 18). 
 
3.2 The three level theory: Demand, Supply and Electoral Rules 
 The theoretical framework behind this project will be divided into three sections; 
demand, supply and legislation. The demand aspect involves what the public wants and can 
be anything ranging from improvements within the public sector to increased individual job 
prosperity. This is closely linked to the next point ,which is about what the political parties 
can do to supply the public in relation to these needs. This may be one of the specific reasons 
as to why the right-wing parties are becoming gradually more popular as problems such as 
the economic situation and immigration are receiving extra publicity in the national media 
and these parties provide what is perhaps a more extreme but also a faster way of combating 
them, in relation to other political parties. Legislation relates to what the political parties are 
legally allowed to do within the laws of the country to try and supply the public in relation to 
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their demand. Also, how the laws constrain actions of different parties within the political 
realm. 
 The public demand in the UK is described as being an ever changing entity due to a 
variety of reasons (Norris 2005: 22). Norris believes the leading cause for this change in 
demand factors has been globalisation. This has led to people in the UK experiencing 
phenomena such as polarisation and xenophobia, which has caused a change in their political 
standpoint and created dealignment from their traditional political parties (Norris 2005: 25). 
Globalisation is one of the reasons for an increase in immigration and multiculturalisation, 
which has caused numerous members of the British population to feel threatened; 
consequently, they have turned to more radical parties in an attempt to make themselves feel 
more secure. Pippa Norris has drawn upon the theories of Adorno et al. and Betz to build the 
first step of her three level model. 
 A major reason for the success of right-wing parties recently has been their reaction to 
this demand by creating populism and altering their strict policies on immigration and the 
EU. Just like public demand, the supply side of this model is also in-static as the realm of 
politics and policies are ever changing. To expand her model to two levels, Norris includes 
the theory of Herbert Kitschelt to explain how the 'spatial location of mainstream parties 
across the ideological spectrum constrains the opportunities for the radical right to expand' 
referring to the importance of the political sphere in the rise of right-wing parties (Norris 
2005: 15). Van der Brug et al. elaborates on this point by stating that the position of 
mainstream parties is critical in the understanding of right-wing parties. The supply aspect 
also refers to rational actions taken by the parties across the ideological spectrum. 
 The final aspect of this model is the electoral rules, both formal and informal, and 
how they limit what political parties can do in relation to their policies and campaigns. The 
formal rules are seen as the legislative framework that controls nomination, campaigns and 
elections, all of ,which are enforced by the law (Norris 2005: 17). Norris then draws upon the 
seminal work of Maurice Duverger outlining how the electoral rules constrain the demand-
supply relationship (Norris 2005: 16). As Gamson and Tarrow argue, electoral rules also 
constrain the opportunity for smaller parties, and distinguishes between a low and high 
threshold in majoritarian and public representation system (Norris 2005: 16). The informal 
rules on the other hand are the norms and values in politics that the majority of parties that 
wish to be successful, keep to.  
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3.3 The 9 point theory by Pippa Norris: 
 To best shed light on the interaction between demand/supply and electoral rules, 
Norris develops a nine point framework for her theory. These nine points help to explain and 
understand how demand/ supply factors interact within the electoral rules of various 
countries. The following is a rundown of these nine points and how they are to be understood 
as a framework for this project. 
 
Model of party competition 
 The first point builds on the 'traditional Downsian rational choice axiom' (Norris 
2005: 19). The theory presumes parties and voters to be located along an ideological 
spectrum, and also awareness of their own position on this spectrum (Norris 2005: 19). The 
theory introduces 'The theoretical model of party competition' and 'the zone of acquiescence' 
(Appendix A, figure 2), which stretch across the ideological spectrum, and represent a 
somewhat broad public consensus. Issues like law and order, health care and educational 
services all lie in this zone of acquiescence (Norris 2005: 21). Parties in parliament are all 
located within the zone of acquiescence, since they all managed to pass a certain threshold. 
The model of party competition stretches from too far right to too far left and the centre is 
where public preferences are highest; but since demand side factors shape both the zone and 
the preferences, none of them are static. As a result of political competition, this theory 
deems parties as mobile actors willing to move across the ideological spectrum to maximise 
voting (Norris 2005: 20). This often regards moving towards the middle and applying a 
populist or catch-all strategy. 
 
The Dynamics of Public Demand 
 Within the theoretical model of party competition, public preference is key. Public 
preferences, or demand, is a fluid term constantly modified by different factors. External 
events can impact public preference dramatically, Norris refers to 9/11 as an example of how 
external events can influence public demand (Norris 2005: 21). Public reaction to 
government polices also shape demand (Norris 2005: 21). Lastly, cultural trends and gradual 
changes in societies do have long-term influence on public preferences, because of a society’s 
ability to reinvent and develop itself. Parties usually try to predict these changes in public 
demand, however, Norris argues that parties seldom are successful when trying to predict 
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change. Parties therefore face the constant dilemma of ideology versus a change in public 
preference.  
 
The Impact of Globalisation 
  Pippa Norris recognises Globalisation as a sort of external event moulding public 
preference. The theory assumes globalisation to be the overarching demand-side factor, and 
reason why right-wing radicalism has risen in popularity (Norris 2005: 23). Norris sees 
globalisation as the main catalyst for demand-side changes, since growing immigration, 
ethnic diversity, economic interdependency and other 'children' of globalisation has led to 
changes in public demand (Norris 2005: 23). 
 
Radical right parties ability to respond to the changes in public demand 
 The changes in public demand, and the ability to effectively accommodate these 
changes is a constant struggle each party across the ideological spectrum faces. Norris argues 
that right-wing parties have responded best to these changes (Norris 2005: 23). She theorises 
three ways for a right-wing party to respond to changes in public demand. The first way is for 
a right-wing party to openly compete with established mainstream parties. The right-wing 
parties therefore need to adapt to broader reaching policies and stretch their ability to manage 
the economy, public services and national security (Norris 2005: 24). This would result in the 
right-wing party moving closer towards the middle of the zone of acquiescence and softening 
their radical views to gain a broader acceptance (Norris 2005: 24). The next strategy 
adaptable for a right-wing party, is to play the role of the villain, by condemning the party or 
coalition in office, and sometimes also other mainstream parties not in office. Sometimes the 
radical right party also criticises the political system or politicians as a class to gains voters 
who share the parties resentment (Norris 2005: 24). This strategy is risky, the party cannot be 
certain that the people who share the parties resentment actually do vote, because of their 
general mistrust in the system (Norris 2005: 24). Lastly, a right-wing party can choose to 
appeal to the voters by supplying specific values, and focus on narrow policies emphasising 
cultural and economic protectionism, anti-immigration and welfare benefits (Norris 2005: 
24). This places the party on the edge of the zone of acquiescence, and as a result the parties 
future is determined by public demand. 
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Facilitating demand-side conditions: Partisan dealignment and Political disaffection 
 Norris recognises partisan dealignment and political disaffection as the outcome of 
demand-side processes. Disaffection with the political system or the sitting government can 
cause voters to vote more radically towards left or right, or not vote at all. This political 
disaffection can benefit right-wing parties if they succeed in obtaining too right rhetoric to 
accommodate this disaffection. Another factor encouraging electoral volatility is partisan 
dealignment, which symbolises a growing mistrust in specific parties or charismatic leaders. 
The electorate foresee their former habitual support and vote for a different party (Norris 
2005: 25). These are the 'actions' Norris recognises as the facilitator for demand-side factors. 
Nevertheless, she does realise they act as 'relatively weak predictors of the electoral support' 
and does not explain the rise of right-wing parties on their own (Norris 2005: 25). 
 
Radical right parties face institutional barriers when trying to gain and maintain 
influence 
 (Norris 2005: 26) This point builds further on the first point of this nine point model, 
and on the Downsian model introduced earlier. The theory assumes that there is no such thing 
as perfect competition. Therefore she argues that we should look at how electoral laws 
constrain political competition and the action of parties. She identifies 'threshold' as an 
important factor shaping action taken by parties and politicians. Whether a country obtains a 
majoritarian system or proportional representation has great influence on how, especially 
right-wing parties, act within the political system. Norris further theorises the need for a 
radical right party to have a strong institutional setup, with charismatic leaders and strong, 
supportive party members. This is necessary if the party wants to avoid becoming a political 
fluke, and if it aims to stay in a position of influence for longer than one term. 
 
Electoral rules shaping the fortunes of parties 
 Point seven builds further on the differences between majoritarian systems and 
systems ,which apply proportional representation (PR). PR often comes with a lower 
threshold, meaning that it takes parties less votes to get seats in parliament. A low threshold 
also causes more diversity in the parliament since it now reflects the diversity in the 
population more proportionally. A majoritarian system, where thresholds are higher, requires 
parties to adapt wider views within the zone of acquiescence to be able to pass the high 
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threshold (Norris 2005: 28). These two systems have different effects on the strategies and 
policies that radical right parties can obtain. With a low threshold, right-wing parties can stick 
to enforcing traditional right-wing views, but when faced with a high threshold the party is 
forced to adapt more broad and common policies to gain political influence and rise above 
this threshold (Norris 2005: 28). 
 
Parties need to develop and sustain party organisations 
 Firstly, this theory assumes that parties need ideology to effectively gain support, but 
to gain constant influence and success organisational structure is important (Norris 2005: 28). 
Radical right parties on the fringe can experience sudden success, but whether they are able 
to sustain success depends to a large extent on their organisational structure, along with 
political strategies (Norris 2005: 29). Internal agreements, decision-making processes and a 
grass root base are important aspects of political parties and highly integral to their success 
(Norris 2005: 29). Parties which start out as disorganised street movements will need to, via 
institutionalisation, create and sustain a party structure. This will allow the party to access 
public funds, develop links assemble volunteers; all equally important for a party’s campaign 
(Norris 2005: 29). 
 
How other parties react to the success of radical right parties 
 When radical right parties expand and enjoy widespread success other parties will try 
to gain back lost ground (Norris 2005: 29). The ninth point elaborates on actions taken by 
other parties as a reaction to the success of the radical right. A natural response from 
mainstream parties is to adapt some right-wing values, or at least mark them as acceptable by 
including these right-wing parties into coalitions. This action resonates towards the public 
and makes the radical right seem less radical, and more accepted by the general population. 
The zone of acquiescence expands as a result of this, and the rise of a radical right causes a 
stir in the political realm (Norris 2005: 29). 
 
3.4 Other Relevant Theories 
 This section covers some theories not included, or only briefly touched on by Pippa 
Norris. The reason we chose to include them is because we believe they help shed light on the 
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specific case of UKIP. Furthermore, we wish to build on Norris theory by adding more 
layers, introducing Euroscepticism, xenophobia and others may help us accomplish that. 
 Globalisation is the main factor and is identified as a cause for all the other demand 
factors mentioned above. The definition of globalisation we are using is Elliot and Urry's, 
who define it as 'massive changes to the very fabric of routine personal, social and economic 
life.' The reason why globalisation is linked to all of the other relevant theories is that it has 
created a global consciousness politically, culturally and economically (Nehring 2013: 279). 
The demand - side factors, researched and analysed in this project, almost all share the 
common ancestor, globalisation. Without globalisation there would be no EU or immigration, 
which are all instrumental in the acceleration of  right-wing radicalism in Europe. 
 As briefly explained in the introduction, the concept of xenophobia is the irrational 
fear of something unusual or foreign (Yakusko 2009: 37). Nationalism and xenophobia are 
closely linked but are not to be confused with each other, nationalism is bluntly put being 
proud of one's nation. The reason for these two concepts being closely linked is that they both 
impact each other. 'By linking dislike of the other to citizenship rights, nationalism turns 
xenophobia from what may, in favourable circumstances, be a mere human foible, into a 
destructive, dangerous force.' (Baumgartl and Favell 1995: 6-7). Xenophobia can be seen as a 
response to increased multiculturalism and immigration as people turn to a traditional right-
wing mindset as they seek to find a scapegoat for the problems they face in society.  
 The theory of polarisation is based around the idea that social inequalities in society 
have led to people dealigning themselves from traditional mainstream political parties and 
instead turning to the other ends of the zone of acquiescence. It has been argued that social 
polarisation has created difficulty in creating a political consensus in relation to responses to 
crises (Keefer and Knack 2002: 1). This is because views are becoming more radical (both 
left and right) and as they are polarising more and more, it is becoming harder to agree on 
these matters. This polarisation is heavily linked to economics and globalisation as these are 
the main reasons as to why 'the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer'. 
Sassen (1991) explains this concept as the social structure changes being due to the rapid 
growth of the financial and business sectors of the economy and this creates a polarisation in 
income and hence quality of life (Sassen 1991: 9, cited by Hamnett 94). 
 As mentioned in the clarification of concepts, the notion of Euroscepticism will be 
used in this project to describe the critical opinions towards the EU system as a whole. 
Euroscepticism has historically been connected to left-wing parties due to the focus on trade 
and growth. Throughout the years the EU has become more integrated with the legislations of 
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the member states. This has created a vast number of sceptics towards the European project. 
These are people who interpret the European integration as too comprehensive and want the 
EU to turn back into what it was at the point of formation. This is depicted in how the 
Conservative Party in Britain has formed its policies, (…) 'Euroscepticism in the 
Conservative Party is fundamentally driven by a powerful hyperglobalist ideology at the very 
centre of the party. The key elements of this ideology include national, economic and political 
independence within a global free market and imply a fundamental opposition to European 
integration' (Gifford 2006: 853). 
 As European integration has increased, so has public criticism towards it. This can be 
seen in the increase in popularity for Eurosceptic parties both on the left and right of the 
political spectrum. In Britain, Gifford argues that '(…) Euroscepticism is intermeshed with the 
politics of the mainstream'. (Gifford 2006: 854). 
 Euroscepticism can take different forms. Gifford argues that there are two categories 
to define types of Euroscepticism, the Hard and the Soft. 'Hard Euroscepticism can be 
defined as fundamental opposition to the idea of political and economic integration (…)' in 
contrast to Soft Euroscepticism, which 'involves contingent or qualified opposition to 
European integration and may express itself in terms of opposition to the specific policies or 
in terms of the defence of national interest' (Gifford 2006: 851). Many parties across Europe 
are involved in Soft Eurosceptic politics, since being critical is a way of gaining votes. This is 
however only true in terms of political rhetoric; such parties would never actually take action 
against the decisions made in the EU. While more Hard Eurosceptic-minded parties do not 
have enough votes to have major influence, they often aim to get rid of the bureaucracy and 
strengthen national sovereignty. 
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Chapter 4 - Electoral Rules 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, we aim to explain the context and constraints in which UKIP acts. 
This chapter will give a brief but detailed introduction to the structures and agencies 
operating within Britain's parliamentary system. We have split the chapter up into five 
sections; the first being a short summary of the UK's parliamentary system and their 
bicameral system. We will go on to clarify the basic electoral rules of Britain and its 
majoritarian voting system; the first past the post system (FPTP). This allows us to delve into 
the case of UKIP starting with its structure, and subsequently moving on to the party leader 
Nigel Farage. After this, we will go on to outline UKIP's most important polices, and also 
how they mobilise voters. We believe that this chapter will function as an outline to the 
following analysis chapter.  
 
4.2 UK Parliamentary System 
 
 In order to understand UKIP’s structure and policies, it is important to understand the 
UK’s parliamentary system and how it is organised.  
 The UK’s parliament follows the bicameral system, or as it is called in the UK: the 
two House-system, where the parliament is separated in two houses; the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords. Both houses have the tasks of law making (legislative), debating 
recent issues and controlling the work of the government (executive). The government 
receives money from the House of Commons who is responsible for approving Bills in 
accordance with tax increases. The houses have to also get approval from one another in 
decision making, in order to make sure that the power is not centred in only one part of the 
system (Parliament 2014, A).  
 The members of the House of Commons are elected by the voters (Parliament 2014, 
A), where the members for the House of Lords have either inherited their seat, gained it for 
being a bishop in the Church of England or have been pointed out by the Queen or another 
legislative figure. The members in this house have their seats for lifetime. This means that the 
House of Lords - the upper chamber of the parliament - is an elite assembly.  
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 The government is formed by the party, which has the most members in the House of 
Commons. If no party has a winning majority, a coalition can be formed. The House of 
Commons is one of the most important places where the Prime Minister, Chancellors, 
ministers and the main figures of the political parties debate important recent issues and make 
proposals for new laws. The Commons are responsible for making Bills about the economy 
like changes in taxes (Parliament 2014, A), where the Lords have to discuss the new law 
proposals and bring up suggestions for changes (BBC News 2012); however, they cannot 
block the law proposal or change it on their own (Parliament 2014, A). The suggestions of 
changes made by the Lords bring the law proposals back to the Commons where it will be 
discussed at a later date. When both Houses reach an agreement for the law, it will then be 
approved by the Queen (BBC News 2012).  
 The House of Commons and the House of Lords are both responsible for ensuring that 
the government lives up to its duties. They both use the same checking method, but the 
procedures are different. The parliament controls the government by questioning ministers, 
debating and having committees to investigate different issues. The government has the right 
to explain and justify policies or decisions (Parliament 2014, B). The questions are directly 
sent to the Prime Minister or other ministers of the government who can either answer them 
orally in the House of Commons or in writing. In addition to this, the parliament has smaller 
committees of MPs (Commons) or Lords whose only task is to investigate a specific policy 
issue or legislation in detail. There are different committees, both permanent and temporary, 
that have different tasks such as offering advice, producing reports or amending legislation 
(Parliament 2014, B).  
 
4.3 UKIP Within the Electoral System 
 
 Electoral rules are important when applying the theory of the radical right by Pippa 
Norris. She sees the rules concerning elections as a factor of great importance, as this can 
either prevent or enhance the chances of a breakthrough for parties outside the zone of 
acquiescence. The zone of acquiescence is, as seen in Figure 2, the spectrum between far 
right and far left policies. The zone of acquiescence is therefore the area where the median 
voter finds him/her self. Therefore as Norris sees it ‘(…) rational parties seek to maximize 
their share of votes and seats by adopting the ideological position closest to the median 
voter’ (Norris 2005: 20)    
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 During an election the country is split up into 650 constituencies, with several 
candidates each, where there is a similar amount of voters (Parliament 2014, C). Each local 
community then elects one candidate to represent the area as a Member of Parliament in the 
House of Commons. This is done through the 'First past the post' System ,which is 
Majoritarian. This system is simply based on the idea that the candidate getting the majority 
of votes wins the seat in The House of Commons. This means that if a candidate receives 
more than 50% of the votes in their area, they get the seat in parliament and the rest of the 
votes do not have an influence on the outcome of the election.  
 
4.4 The Structure of UKIP 
 
 UKIP is structured like most other political parties with a national executive whose 
main task is to run the party. They also organise annual conferences, which are open for 
every member of the party, and they are responsible for developing policies alongside with 
the conference that is responsible for making policies. There is also a series of committees, 
which are responsible for making the policy development possible (Ingle 2008: 161).  The 
leader of the party is democratically elected by postal ballot of the party members. The leader 
has a Cabinet, where he or she offers advice (Ingle 2008: 161).   
 (UKIP, cited in Usherwood, 2008: 13) The changes, that the UKIP party structure has 
been undergoing, have had a positive effect on the party’s success. The founder of the party 
Alan Sked had made a constitutional document for the founding of the party that was too 
ambitious. The party has been facing struggles in living up to the requirements. One of the 
requirements is to have stability in membership and leadership and it has only been possible 
to find members to take up posts in the recent years. Therefore it was easier for more radical 
elements to access positions of power. 
 (UKIP, cited in Usherwood, 2008: 13) The party has also been facing problems 
between the leadership and membership. Particularly when the party gained success it 
became possible for those individuals to get more access to much more reliable funding 
mostly outside the control of the party for their activities. That is caused by the fact that much 
of the membership is passive. The Members of European Parliament (MEP) had used much 
of the party’s resources, which resulted in the resignation of the party chairman, Petrina 
Holdsworth, in 2005. This issue has been solved by the rise of the ‘chequebook politics’. 
UKIP is dependent on their supporters of its financing. They have a small number of affiliates 
that provides a large part of their financing.  
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4.5 UKIP Policies  
 
 In order to understand the rise of UKIP it is important to understand its policies and 
what they stand for. UKIP’s policies are very similar to the Conservative party since Nigel 
Farage was a former member of the Conservative party (Jones and Norton 2014: 87), but they 
are also promoting some policies that appeal to the rest of the voters (Ford and Goodwin 
2014:  278).  
 At the beginning UKIP was appearing as a single-issue party. A single issue party is a 
party that has focus on a particular issue. UKIP’s issue was UK’s participation in the EU. 
They are Eurosceptic and that allowed them to become a popular party, but that was not 
enough to maintain the success and popularity or even gain more voters. So they had to adapt 
more issues in order to expand their appeal (Robinson, et al. 2013).   
 Today UKIPs most popular policy is about the increasing immigration into the UK. 
Their candidate in the Rochester and Strood, Mark Reckless, has made a view of sending 
European immigrants back to their countries or force them to leave the country and go 
elsewhere, if UKIP wins power. UKIP has plans of controlling the immigration from 
European countries. That is one of its seven most controversial policies (Graham 2014). 
UKIP will give work permissions only to the necessary labour that fulfils the extended 
requirements for achieving work permission. They must have a job, speak English, have a 
residence before arriving and health insurance that is approved by the NHS. Therefore UKIP 
wants to leave the EU, so they can regain control of the borders (UKIP).  
 UKIP would prefer to abolish the Scottish parliament and the Welsh and North Irish 
assemblies (Ingle 2008: 160). This is not uncommon for a nationalistic party such as UKIP. 
One of UKIP’s policies that is available on their webpage is about maintaining the NHS 
(Ingle 2008: 160). While recent footage of Nigel Farage saying that 'he would feel more 
comfortable if Britain’s healthcare system was opened up to the marketplace' (Graham 
2014). UKIP also promises its voters to make a review of EU’s regulations and legislations 
and remove those who repress British prosperity and competitiveness as part of its policy of 
job protection and increasing prosperity. They also want to 'repair' the UK economy by 
ensuring big business companies pay a minimum tax and increasing the personal allowance. 
They will reduce future debt by making some abolishment and reductions in i.e. the foreign 
aid, the High Speed 2 project (HS2), remove the green subsidies and abolishing the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
(UKIP 2014). Nigel Farage believes that windmills are not the best source of renewable 
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energy. According to his opinion they are too expensive and do not work (Graham 2014). 
However, they want the government to replace fossil fuels by investing in other technologies 
for energy sources such as nuclear energy; something which they are strongly in favour of 
(Ingle 2008: 160). 
 (UKIP 2014) For the youth, UKIP promises to remove tuition fees for some approved 
degrees of scientific and technical educations, but they must pay tax to the UK for five years 
after ending their education. UKIP will also make it possible for more than the targeted 50% 
to enter universities. But they will make it difficult to have many children, by limiting 
childcare to be paid for the two first children only. UKIP also supports the bedroom policy, 
where there must be paid tax to every 'empty' bedroom that might be caused by children 
moving out. This policy should reduce accommodation issues. 
 For the transportation as earlier mentioned UKIP will abolish the HS2 project in order 
to make some saving, but they will also abolish tolls on public roads and maintain pensioner 
bus passes (UKIP 2014). 
 Beside the listed policies UKIP wants to support Putin in the fight against Islamic 
extremism, because according to Nigel Farage Russia might be very helpful in the war 
against Islamic extremism (Graham 2014). 
 
4.6 Political Mobility  
 
 Frank Bealey defined ‘political mobilisation’ as 'the activity of rousing masses of 
people, both to express themselves politically and also to undertake political action' (1999: 
214). Accordingly, political mobilisation takes form when politicians and those working with 
them engage with the public in order to invite them to join their cause by voting for them or 
attending the party’s public debates etc. UKIP gained members in the local council by 
interacting with the public by starting from local, to regional and then working their way into 
national levels, the same as the Liberal Democrats did in the 1980s and 90s (BBC News 
2013). They learned from practice that they could not just make it up as they went along i.e. 
shout their way into power, so they understood early on that they would have to work hard, 
therefore no time constraints were set, as it would take many years before they could see any 
impact on society or people taking them seriously and accepting them (BBC News 2013). 
 UKIP also mobilises support by actively participating on social media’s such as, 
Facebook and Twitter to keep supporters up to date with the latest news. Its webpage also 
offers and encourages voters to become involved by volunteering, donating, spreading the 
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word or becoming members etc. Furthermore, people can purchase items relating to UKIP or 
its message from the site. By involving the individuals to enthusiastically commit to UKIP, it 
has made the party more likeable and popular amongst those who did not appreciate them 
when they first started out. UKIP subsequently offers the nation a set of policies, which it 
promises to implement. This is clearly states on its webpage, available for all to examine. 
These are amongst a few of its policies:  
 Firstly, as a political party they are known for their patriotic stance, as they are very 
nationalistic and they take pride in Britain for its rich history. They do this by encouraging 
that more people ought to take pride and be thankful for everything that it has contributed to. 
UKIP would offer the public, a return of power to the UK, protection of borders, rebuilding 
prosperity, safeguarding against crime, care and support for all and free speech and 
democracy (UKIP 2014). 
 Secondly, the party promises to always uphold the laws and to abide by them, 
therefore they would never allow for discrimination against individuals due to their ethnicity, 
religious beliefs and social class etc. they would decrease taxes on the public and businesses, 
also they would not get involved in personal decisions of individuals (UKIP 2014). 
 Thirdly, UKIP participates actively in all elections that they are permitted to enter 
within the nation, ranging from local elections to the EP elections. They have sought to 
maintain a domestic and foreign policy that Britain should comply with if elected into Power. 
They participate actively in local, regional and national elections and accept all seats won in 
elections, also they are willing to work together with other political parties that share the 
same democratic and libertarian views and are cohesive with the same message that UKIP are 
trying to relay and wanting to carry out (UKIP 2014).  
 As they are known to be a populist party that provides the public with the 
requirements that they crave, UKIP tend to mobilise its voters through the means of 
appealing to the public’s needs by making policies that link to what they want.  Most of the 
voters that they have gathered tend to be women and they continue to be loyal the party 
(Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011: 26). However voters differ when it come to the general 
election and the European elections, firstly the general election typically attract voters from a 
working class background who are dissatisfied with the perceived idea that ‘immigrants are 
taking their jobs.’ This is a typical populist slogan that has the connotation of giving back the 
jobs to the native people. (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011: 26). 
  Also, in the European elections voters usually come from a middle-class background 
who are financially stable but 'to express ‘hostility to the EU' (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 
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2011: 23), they choose to vote for UKIP as a solution to their problems of getting out of the 
union. This is also a way for them to express to the party that they do vote for during general 
elections, that they need to amend on its policies otherwise they could lose their votes 
permanently (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011: 26). These types of voters are likely to be 
males of white British descent, however age also varies with those voting at EP’s being 
middle aged and those voting at general elections being younger, looking at the different 
types who vote for UKIP, it is hard to pin down who the genuine supporters are, as the results 
differ in each election (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011: 23). 
 Having now explained how the political system in the United Kingdom functions, 
what UKIP's standpoints on different issues are and having highlighted their increased 
popularity, we are now able to analyse and understand the reasons for the success of UKIP in 
recent years. These are the factors that constrain the supply and demand relationship and 
create potential for increased UKIP support. 
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Chapter 5 -  Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction  
  
 This chapter will present our analysis of UKIP; it is divided into three sections 
consisting of Norris’s theory of demand and supply, and the factors prior to this. Firstly, 
political disaffection and partisan dealignment are two of the variables, which we will try to 
understand in relation to the political processes at play. We will link this in with how they 
have aided UKIP success. Secondly, the Eurosceptic dimension of UKIP seeks to understand 
and analyse how it has led to the rise of the party and how this has influenced public opinion 
on the subject. The demand is the public’s attitude and response towards the changes in the 
country; what is it that the public wants politicians to improve upon? We will answer this 
question by using our sub-question 'How is public demand reflected in UKIP policies 
regarding immigration and the EU?’.  'Immigration, multiculturalisation' and 'social 
inequality, xenophobia and polarisation' will also be examined in order to grasp an 
understanding of how the public feels and their reaction to the current changes taking place in 
the country. The supply side is how parties provide the people with what they have asked for. 
We shall answer this with our other sub-question: 'How does UKIP attempt to act according 
to populism? '. Through analysis, we will be able to review how UKIP intends to supply its 
support with what it needs through its policies and see whether or not UKIP actually has 
responded to the demand, but also how they attempt to create the demand. Populism will be 
an occurring factor within this chapter as UKIP is known for being a particularly populist 
party. Pippa Norris, Chris Gifford and UKIP’s webpage amongst other various sources have 
helped us gain knowledge to establish a thorough analysis of UKIP.  
 
5.2 Political disaffection/ Partisan dealignment 
  
 The fact that UKIP poses a threat, which the Conservatives fail to acknowledge could 
become their downfall as they could lose out on becoming the 'largest single force' in the next 
general election, ,which would allow the Labour party who 'might not be popular but, much 
like the Socialists defeating the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in France in 2012, it 
could win almost by default' (Oxan.com, 2014). If this were to occur it would not be due to 
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popularity but because with the Conservative out of the way the Labour party can stand a 
chance of winning the election. By this happening the Conservative would be assisting in the 
advancement of the Labour party whereas it would be hindering its own success. 
 Therefore, David Cameron will undergo various pressures in order to reinforce his 
negotiating position to gain the British population’s trust ahead of the next general election. 
This will mainly consist of his position on the powers he would like to have sent back to 
Britain as a confirmed renegotiation or to reschedule the in/out referendum date from 2017 to 
2016 (Oxan 2014).  Although, Cameron has not given any official position on the matter, 
which in turn will not look good for the Conservatives if the UKIP continues in rising in polls 
(Oxan 2014). Consequently if Cameron does not come with a better strategy of tackling the 
ever growing UKIP support he will lose more voters but more importantly also support for 
the re-election in 2015. As he has managed to create a negative reputation, so people become 
hesitant to vote for him and elect him into office. 
 A trend of growing political disaffection causing great partisan dealignment, is what 
UKIP is feeding so successfully on. Political disaffection is according to Pippa Norris (2005) 
the process in which a growing antipathy with the government or political system weaken 
habitual support for mainstream parties (Norris 2005: 25). This process can then create 
partisan dealignment whereby voters deviate from their usual party (Norris 2005: 25). These 
processes are present in Britain today. Recently, problems for Labour and the Conservatives 
have led to advantages for UKIP. Growing political disaffection and concern for the political 
system have greatly affected the fortunes of Labour and the Conservatives, as they are the 
two main parties in British politics today. Statistics show that in 2014, political disaffection is 
at an all-time high. Only 10% believed that politicians are trying to do their best for their 
country, 30% think that politicians are only acting to benefit their party, and 40% think that 
politicians are only out for themselves (YouGov 2014, Appendix A, figure 3). Even though 
people have always questioned the authority and motives of politicians, these numbers are 
important. Another attestation of these processes is the fact that 35% of the British population 
now supports a party which is not the Conservatives or Labour (YouGov 2014, Appendix A, 
figure 4). This number is up from just above 20% in June 2012. This shows an ongoing 
disbelief in the two-party system, but also a positive trend for the smaller parties, as a result 
of voters becoming increasingly unpredictable.  
 The reason UKIP has been able to capitalise on and help create this disaffection is 
because of its strong voice against the established system, and its so-called 'anti-politics.' 
Anti-policies are counter-active political strategies questioning the norms of a certain 
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political system. UKIP’s success with anti-politics is another testament to the processes of 
political disaffection and partisan dealignment. UKIP headlines like: 'Migration: A decade of 
failure for both parties' (UKIP 2014) 'Cameron caught lying at PMO’s' (UKIP 2014) and 
'Labour’s endless lies about UKIP and the NHS are a sign of total desperation' (UKIP 2014) 
show significant disaffection towards the established parties and political system. By 
obtaining a negative rhetoric, UKIP has succeeded in supplying public demand to a certain 
extent. When a shift in public opinion occurs, Norris’ theory states that a radical right party 
can act in three different ways, when trying to  gain available votes created by this shift in 
opinion( Norris 2004: 24). '…the radical right may seek to undermine support for the 
political system by negative attacks, especially those directed against the performance and 
record of the main party or party coalition in government' (Norris 2004: 24).  
UKIP has been able to successfully act and take advantage of this antipathy with the current 
mainstream parties. With these anti-policies, and their negative rhetoric, UKIP is winning 
votes from both the Conservatives and Labour, but for two very different reasons.  
 Political parties often represent different sides of the political spectrum and they use 
this opposition to further gain popularity, however when they have shared interests it could 
lead them into coalition governments for example the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 
(Maiese and Norlen 2003). Although coalitions are not always successful as there can be 
miscommunications, for instance, Cameron and Clegg seem to be going in opposite 
directions, with the Conservatives moving more to the right to convince UKIP votes that they 
are able to cater to their concerns in a more efficient manner. On the other hand, the Liberal 
Democrats seem to be moving more left to regain lost voters that have since moved towards 
Labour (Oxam 2014). For this reason, it is very doubtful to assume that there will be an 
agreement of policies in time for the 2015 general elections. If the coalition does not seem to 
particularly effective in its cooperation, then it will be the downfall for both parties and any 
advantage that they did have such as the recovery of the UK economic system, would not be 
of any use to them (Oxam 2014).  
 Consequently, this could also mean that UKIP might stand a better chance of 
attracting more voters if the coalition collapses, as a number of Conservative supporters and 
recently two MP’s have already left them or are planning on leaving. 'UKIP now insists no 
Tory chair is protected and has suggested other Conservative MPs are some-more 
approaching to defect' (Ansteydesign 2014) .This was amongst the response after they won 
the Rochester by-election and it shows that UKIP is not only becoming popular to the public 
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but also to other party members. Furthermore, this has been a boost of confidence for UKIP 
as it has become self-satisfied by beating the conservatives once again.   
 We are aware of the close affiliation between the Conservatives and UKIP. UKIP’s 
leader and MEP, Nigel Farage, is a former member of the Conservatives, and UKIP’s two 
new MP’s Mark Reckless and Douglas Carswell are former conservatives as well. The 
differences in policies between the two parties are not especially noteworthy, however, the 
position of the two parties is. 48% of UKIP voters would have voted for the Conservatives if 
UKIP had not existed (YouGov 2014). Nevertheless, UKIP offers a more radical, more 
Eurosceptic approach, and since UKIP does not have to simultaneously fight a battle for 
office with Labour, they can act more candidly. MP Mark Reckless says that UKIP is 'giving 
much clearer ideas about the policies we’re campaigning on' (The Guardian 2014). Also, 
Reckless' webpage states 'I’m afraid that my party leadership is now part of Britain’s 
problem' (markreckless 2014). According to Reckless himself, UKIP allows him to return to 
'real' politics and keep the promises he made when he was elected MP the first time 
(markreckless 2014). The flow of voters, and now also MP’s, from the conservatives to UKIP 
is what aided UKIP’s rise early on, but now it seems as though UKIP is also stealing votes 
from Labour.  
 A study conducted by YouGov on the 17th November 2014 shows the growing 
number of former Labour voters now supporting UKIP. For every 9 votes UKIP has taken 
from Conservatives, it has taken 6 from Labour (YouGov 2014). From January 2013, when 
only 7% percent of UKIP supporters were former Labour voters, up until October 2014 there 
has been a 16% increase in that number and is now 23% (YouGov 2014). Even though no 
Labour MP’s have renounced their party and joined UKIP, it is still a trend worth noticing. 
Moreover, the days were UKIP was a fringe party only taking voters from the Conservatives 
are over; UKIP has now established itself across the ideological spectrum, and is well within 
the zone of acquiescence. 
 
5.3 The Eurosceptic dimensions of UKIP 
 
 The recent European Parliament elections show that Eurosceptic parties across the 
continent are increasing the number of MEPs and thus illustrate the growing influence they 
will have in the future of European politics. In Britain, UKIP became the biggest political 
party, winning the majority vote ,which surpassed both the Conservatives and Labour. 
Euroscepticism is not a new issue in British politics; in fact Gifford argues that it has been a 
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factor for many years. The latest wave of British Euroscepticism though, according to 
Gifford, can be tracked back to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which led to a 
crisis in the Conservative Party: 'The conflict over Maastricht consolidated a shift to the right 
by the Conservative Party which was centred on a populist reassertion of a right-wing belief 
in British exceptionalism against which European integration was symbolically constituted as 
the ‘other’’ (Berrington & Hague, cited by Gifford 2006: 862).  
 Gifford argues that the Maastricht treaty split British politics. The signing of the treaty 
and the following frustration led to the birth of the political party UKIP. The following years 
both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives have called for a referendum to pull 
Britain out of the EU, though this has not happened yet. The fact that it has not happened, has 
really boosted support for UKIP and this is explicitly explained on their website; ‘UKIP will 
leave the EU, and take back control of our borders’ (UKIP 2014).                                      
 UKIP might be the most Eurosceptic Party in Europe with Nigel Farage as the 
ultimate leading figure. In a video on UKIP’s website, he is speaking in the European 
Parliament with pride when saying, 'Euroscepticism is growing across the European Union. 
No one, not even the maniacs that believe in the project would question it' (UKIP 2014). In 
the European Parliament, Nigel Farage and his fellow UKIP MEPs are in the group ‘Europe 
of Freedom and Direct Democracy’ (EFD), together with parties as the Italian ‘5 Star 
Movement’ and the radical right-wing party from Sweden ‘Sverigedemokraterna’. The name 
of the EFD group is self-explanatory when you have their Eurosceptic agenda in mind. Nigel 
Farage is infamous in the European Parliament for asking questions that are too great a 
nuisance for the former EU President, Herman von Rompuy. In a speech held by Farage in 
2010 he describes the charisma of Herman von Rompuy as being equivalent to ‘the charisma 
of a damp rag’ and that Rompuy has ‘the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk’ (The 
Guardian 2010). ‘UKIP believes in Britain becoming a democratic, self-governing country 
once again. This can only be achieved by getting our nation out of the European Union and 
reasserting the sovereignty of Parliament’ (UKIP 2014). This statement is just another 
example of how Eurosceptic UKIP is. By saying ‘UKIP believes in Britain becoming a 
democratic, self-governing country once again’, it is implicit that Britain is not currently a 
democratic state; hereby indirectly blaming the EU.  
 A message on UKIP’s website says; ‘UKIP is a patriotic party that believes in putting 
Britain first. Only UKIP will return self-government to the British people.’ (UKIP 
2014). This message seems to get across quite well in Britain. After all UKIP enjoyed 
enormous success at the European Parliament elections in May 2014. This is a party which 
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has been labelled as a single-issue party, and it won the majority of the MEPs attending the 
meeting in Brussels. It seems as if the ordinary British citizen can relate to the thoughts of 
UKIP and Nigel Farage and their policies on the EU and immigration. We have to remember 
that it, of course, is easier for a single-issue party to get support in an election, which focuses 
on their single-issue. UKIP has gone from a party not taken seriously to a more respected 
party through a strategy Gifford describes as general for factional parties; ‘Euroscepticism 
becomes a central strategy by ,which non-mainstream parties or factions within mainstream 
parties attempt to gain political advantage.’ (Gifford 2006: 851) It is rightful to say that 
UKIP really has gained political advantage while they, in fact, are the most strongly 
represented party from Britain in the EP. UKIP’s ideology is as earlier mentioned xenophobic 
(See 5.1) and its approach to the EU is exactly the same, as UKIP seeks to; ‘Prevent foreign 
criminals entering the UK by re-introducing border controls that the EU forced us to 
abandon’ (UKIP 2014).  
 
5.4 Cultural Protectionism  
 
 UKIP has created a clear-cut strategy on cultural protectionism. This can be seen 
through its desire to pull Britain out of the European Union. The party has a vision of saving 
money from the contribution to the EU budget, ‘UKIP will leave the EU and save at least 
£8bn pa in net contributions’ (UKIP 2014). Defining UKIP as a party practicing cultural 
protectionism is not simply something that we are doing in this project. It is a clear policy 
from the party itself, when talking about an optimal version of the British relation to the EU 
on their website; ‘Free trade, but not political union, with our European neighbours. We are 
the EU’s largest export market: they depend on us for jobs - not the other way around’ 
(UKIP 2014). This is also backed up by Chris Gifford’s view on Euroscepticism on the right: 
‘In particular, right-wing Euroscepticism has drawn on ideological strands within 
Conservatism defined by its opposition to political interdependence in the global economy 
and interventionist government at the domestic level. This implies a return to laissez-faire in 
the world economy and minimal, yet strong, government on the domestic front’ (Gifford 
2006: 857). The minimal, yet strong government on the domestic front can be traced in 
UKIP’s policies towards immigration where they include on their website under the menu 
‘policies for the people’ state that ‘Migrants will only be eligible for benefits (in work or out 
of work) when they have been paying tax and NI for five years and will only be eligible for 
permanent residence after ten years’ (UKIP 2014). These restrictions would be extremely 
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hard on immigrants and can be seen as a ‘shield’ to protect Britain from foreigners. 
  
 Pippa Norris’ theory is offering an explanation for how right-wing parties act in order 
to gain voters in a majoritarian system (See Chapter 4) as the British; ‘in this context, radical 
right parties will fail to gain office unless they also expand their policy platform and 
ideological appeals beyond cultural protectionism to encompass a broader range of values 
and if they dilute their ideology with populist appeals’ (Norris 2005: 28). According to 
Norris, parties on the extreme right seek to maximise their votes located at the right-pole of 
the political scheme through putting focus on cultural protectionism and terms attached to it; 
‘Radical right parties therefore emphasize the values associated with cultural protectionism 
in a strategic attempt to build support, emphasizing signature issues such as the repatriation 
of immigrants, the closure of borders to ‘foreigners’, and economic protectionism’ (Norris 
2005: 24). In the case of UKIP, this quote from Norris describes the party pretty accurately, 
except from the part of economic protectionism. This is because UKIP has not proposed any 
legislation subsidising specific sectors of the British economy but have actually taken a direct 
stand against it on i.e. the windmill industry but instead want to lower taxes (UKIP 2014). As 
mentioned numerous times in both this and recent chapters, UKIP has come with many 
xenophobic, anti-immigration statements, so in that matter the party fits in well with Norris’ 
theory.  
 Pippa Norris builds further on how right wing parties act in order to maximise their 
votes; ‘They may also advocate more diverse economic and social policies only loosely 
related to cultural protectionism, such as (…) stringent requirements to qualify for public 
services and welfare benefits (…)’ (Norris 2005: 24). In this case, the theory of Norris fits 
well with UKIP policies. As an example of a social policy, UKIP has on its webpage, a 
statement saying; ‘Businesses should be able to discriminate in favour of young British 
workers’ (UKIP 2014), this is a clear example of direct cultural protectionism and populism, 
as this appeals to young unemployed Brits, who might have the perception that EU citizens 
are taking their jobs. On the stringent requirements to qualify for welfare benefits, UKIP also 
has a policy. As earlier mentioned, they are of the mindset that immigrants can get benefits 
when they have been ‘paying tax and NI for five years and will only be eligible for permanent 
residence after ten years’ (UKIP 2014). Policies that are anti-immigration are predominantly 
also Eurosceptic. This is in the case of UKIP due to the strong opposition against the 
Schengen program within the EU, which gives citizens from other EU countries the right to 
free movement. Euroscepticism is the core of UKIP’s policies and a major reason for the 
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growing support for the party. UKIP is the party that is most clear on the subject of a 
referendum, as this might have attracted frustrated voters who do not want to wait for it any 
longer. Cultural Protectionism definitely has a great impact on the rise of UKIP.  
 
5.5 Immigration, Multiculturalisation & Social Inequality: 
 
 The greater part of this segment in our project will be written in the light of our sub-
question: 'How is public demand reflected in UKIP policies regarding immigration and the 
EU?' In accordance with Norris' rigid theory of 'demand, supply and electoral factors,' we 
will delve deeper into some of the individual factors ,which we maintain to be instrumental in 
the increase in support for UKIP (Norris 2005: 18). 
 Over the past several decades, immigration has without doubt been one of the most 
prominent social issues Britain has had to deal with. The UK population's polarised outlook 
on this topic has led to right-wing parties, such as UKIP, having to develop tailor-made anti-
immigration policies in order to satisfy the public's growing demand for immigration to be 
combated. According to M. Dummett (2004), immigration is an issue whereby countries 
allow people who are not national citizens to 'enter and settle within its territory' (Dummett 
2004: 115). With the aid of our sub-question, we will now explore the effect immigration has 
on voters' mindsets and UKIP's success. 
  Immigration, multiculturalisation and social inequality are three of the causal 
mechanisms behind the public drive in support for UKIP, which we have chosen especially to 
examine. This will be done in order to give us an insight into how these social phenomena 
affect voters' outlook on the party. Moreover, the following piece of writing will also study 
the great social division in Britain so as to give us an explanation as to why certain social 
classes are more likely to vote for UKIP than others. As previously mentioned in chapter 
three, Norris categorises immigration and multiculturalisation as demand factors, seeing as 
both have emerged in British society as by-products of globalisation (Norris 2005: 16). 
Immigration is one of the big political issues in Britain today. According to YouGov studies, 
public opinion finds the importance of issues concerning immigration to surpass both the EU 
referendum and the nation's fiscal issues, such as, the minimum wage (YouGov 2014, 
Appendix A, figure 5). Immigration is only surpassed by NHS spending.  
 Norris manages to precisely sum up the overarching argument in our project in 
respect to immigration, quoting, 'The instrumental argument suggests that what matters are 
not levels of immigration per se, but rather the belief that any influx of new minorities could 
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take away public benefits such as housing, depress wages in low-skilled jobs, or exacerbate 
unemployment levels' (Norris 2005: 177).'This seems to be the case in Britain, in a poll 
carried out on the 22nd October, 2014, YouGov set out to identify the main factors leading to 
hostility towards immigrants for a UKIP voter. The four reoccurring factors were: 1) Public 
finances: the concern that immigrants would come to Britain to 'sponge' off the welfare-
system. 2) Jobs: The fact that low-skilled jobs will be 'stolen' by immigrants. 3) Access to 
public services: The NHS is suffering, schools are overcrowded and housing is in short 
supply. The fear that these public goods are going to the 'wrong' people; namely, the 
immigrants. 4) Culture: That British culture is being marginalised by immigrants (YouGov 
2014). Nevertheless, it is important to remember that these concerns may not be fully 
justified. YouGov points to the many advantages of the recent flow of immigrants. Out of 2.3 
million EU immigrants only 60.000 collect unemployment benefits, less than three percent 
(YouGov 2014). The amount of taxes paid by immigrants by far supersedes the amount of 
welfare received by immigrants (YouGov 2014). 
 British citizens are not particularly worried about the numerical total of immigrants 
residing in Britain, but rather, are more concerned with the worry that immigrants are moving 
to the UK simply to take advantage of the well-functioning social welfare system and make 
the most of the free health care system (Meagher 2013). Though Norris does not refer 
specifically to UKIP in her writings, she postulates that right-wing parties in Europe have 
become even more radical in their rhetorics, in response to the people's growing want to deal 
with the problems associated with immigration (Norris 2005: 177). Citizens have become fed 
up and impatient and as a result, have discovered that they can actively express their disdain 
for the presence of immigrants by voting for their countries' most right-wing political party. 
In this case, this would account for why UKIP has gained so much support by the British 
public, since the UKIP has consciously responded to this change in public attitude. 
 UKIP's success in creating unique policies in relation to immigration is an additional 
reason as to why UKIP has become so popular. In light of Norris' concept of supply and 
demand, it is clear how UKIP's policy suggestions (supply) have been conscientiously 
thought out in correlation with the British public's desire for action (demand). UKIP acts in 
the public interest. A clear example of this is in UKIP's policies, whereby UKIP demands an 
immediate halt on further immigration, and the expulsion of illegal immigrations from the 
country (Ford 2012: 209). 
  Furthermore, Norris makes the point that in the political realm, there are far too many 
parties with similar rhetorics and policies; in contrast, far right movements, such as UKIP, 
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distinguish themselves by emphasising the slightly more extreme side to them. This links in 
particularly well with a Ford's line of reasoning, who maintains, '...hostility to immigration 
and disaffection with mainstream political elites are associated with significantly higher 
UKIP support overall' (Ford 2012: 206). Not only do the public show their approval of 
UKIP's anti-immigration proposals by voting for it at elections, but it is also due to the fact 
that very few of the other political parties in Britain have policies, which encompass these 
issues. The British National Party (BNP) is of course the other right-wing party in Britain, 
which the public have the opportunity to vote for. Yet,  past elections have demonstrated that 
British citizens would rather vote for UKIP, since, unlike the BNP, it is not associated with 
violence, disguised racism and antisemitism (Ford 2012: 209).  
 An additional factor Norris examines in connection with immigration, is  
multiculturalisation. This is a relatively new philosophy that welcomes the unification of 
foreign cultures into one society; a society in ,which all ethnic minorities are accepted and 
share equal rights. Scholars propose several different definitions of multiculturalisation, many 
of whom choose to highlight a certain aspect of it. For example, Ben Rafael emphasises the 
religious aspect, stating '...world religions are effectively a major agent of the 
multiculturalisation of contemporary societies' (Ben Rafael 2010: 16). The issues associated 
with multiculturalisation link in appropriately with our research question, since, according to 
Norris (2005), right-wing political parties are benefiting from the growing 
multiculturalisation in Europe, as many see it as a threat to 'national values.' 
  Essentially, Norris argues that people who feel they are being threatened by the ways 
in, which multiculturalism manifests itself, for example, through the disappearance of the 
dominant language, religion and food etc. may decide to vote for a right-wing national party 
in the hope that this party will revert the country to its former self (Norris 2005: 17). This 
argument can be directly applied to UKIP and its rise in popularity in Britain. Exemplified in 
the formerly mentioned YouGov survey, where a loss of cultural values and the fear of 
marginalisation by immigrants in your own country were contributing factors to UKIP 
support. Time and time again, UKIP has expressed its disdain towards immigration and 
multiculturalisation; two of the currently most controversial topics in British politics. Citizens 
use their vote 'to register concern over domestic issues,' which they believe, other political 
parties in the running have either, overlooked or simply failed to address (Ford 2012: 209). 
Seeing as both BNP and UKIP lend themselves to the more right-wing inclined voter, it 
would seem that UKIP has become the clear favourite, not only due to the fact that its 
policies directly respond to public opinion on the problems of multiculturalisation, but also 
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by default; many perceive the BNP to be too extreme to be able to combat such social issues 
in a meaningful way.   
 A third causal factor driving support for UKIP is social inequality. Though not 
explicitly discussed by Norris, it is implied throughout her writings, suggesting the social 
breakdown of a nation can lead to tensions amongst its people. To give us a general overview 
of what the term 'social inequality' entails, we have looked to the definition put forward by 
Kerbo, who defines social inequality as 'the condition where people have unequal access to 
valued resources, services, and positions in the society' (Kerbo 2003: 11). 
 We find it also important to examine how great an influence the divide between 
Britain's social classes has had on the number of people voting for UKIP.  In his 
comprehensive synopsis of why UKIP has grown in popularity, Ford (2012) suggests that 
social inequality in Britain has also had an effect on voting patterns. He compares UKIP with 
the BNP, stating, 'Anxieties about unemployment, livings standards and future earnings are 
all more common among UKIP supporters' (Ford 2012: 213). According to Ford, (2012) it 
would seem one's income plays the greatest role in determining ,which political party one 
will vote for; in this case, surveys have shown how all economic uncertainty is linked with 
increased support for UKIP. The typical, 'core-voter' for UKIP is a working-class man who 
finds it somewhat difficult to get by on his current income. Not only are these voters 
struggling to make a living, but they are also dissatisfied with how both their local 
communities and the nation are changing. UKIP voters also hold below average numbers in 
education and social class. According to YouGov, only 14% of UKIP voters have a university 
education, as opposed to 28% on a national level. Furthermore, 52% of UKIP voters have 
GCSEs or lower as their highest form of education (YouGov 2014). The national average in 
this category is 34% (YouGov 2014). The young, white, working-class men feel as though 
they are strangers in their own country, seeing as Britain has developed so quickly in terms of 
economics. If we are to take a wider perspective on this issue, it is apparent how globalisation 
connects with both economic growth in Britain and the ever-changing mindset of its people. 
This is something we will analyse more deeply in the last section of this chapter. Moreover, 
the ruling elite are growing in size and the polarisation between these two groups in society is 
leading to frustration amongst those who have very little. Unlike the BNP, UKIP has made 
the conscious choice to reach out to people of all social classes and backgrounds, which, in 
turn, though perhaps a slightly risky strategy to take, has paid off.  
 We suspected that certain social phenomena present in modern day British society 
were behind UKIP's gain in popularity. This hypothesis is corroborated by both Ford and 
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Norris; immigration, multiculturalisation and social inequality are unequivocally instrumental 
in the rise in support for the UKIP. Nevertheless, seeing as there are very few published 
statistics on the subject matter, it is rather difficult to determine, which of these three social 
factors has been the most influential.  
 
5.6 Xenophobia: 
 
 When looking at immigration and multiculturalisation, the term xenophobia also lends 
itself rather well as a variable in the rise of support for UKIP. As explained in chapter three, 
xenophobia as a concept is something often linked to reasons for supporting right-wing 
parties as they provide a sort of defensive mechanism in response to 'the unknown'. UKIP has 
often been associated with racism simply due to its right-wing nature and policies on 
immigration. According to recent statistics the very nature of xenophobia is happening 
presently in Britain. 58% of UKIP say immigration has had a negative impact on their daily 
lives, and furthermore 90% believe immigration has had negative influence in Britain overall, 
as opposed to 28% and 65% with Conservative voters (YouGov 2014, Appendix A, figure 6). 
The impact of immigration on daily life was then tested by YouGov. However they found 
that only a small sample of the 58% had any personal experience with their daily lives being 
blighted by immigration (YouGov 2014). This suggest that a general fear and suspicion of the 
unknown is one of the driving forces for these views on immigration. 
 Recently there has been a large increase in net migration in Britain, the year ending 
March 2014 there were 243,000 long term migrants compared to only 175,000 in the previous 
12 months, a 39% increase (Office for national statistics, 2014). This is one of the reasons for 
UKIP's success as this increase in immigration has created a sense of anger and confusion in 
the wider British public due to the commonly perceived idea that immigrants are harming 
British society in terms of employment and culture change among many other things. In 
relation to Pippa Norris' theory of Public demand and governmental supply, xenophobia can 
be seen as a cause for public demand as it is not something that the population require but 
rather a cause for racism and prejudiced views towards minority views, which they then turn 
to UKIP in hope that they will make changes to the legislation in the country in order to solve 
this. This can be seen from some of UKIP's policies such as: 'UKIP recognises the benefits of 
limited, controlled immigration' and 'Migrants will only be eligible for benefits (in work or 
out of work)  when they have been paying tax and NI for five years and will only be eligible 
for permanent residence after ten years' (UKIP 2014). 
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 Although perhaps not as extreme as the British National Party (BNP), it can still be 
seen that these policies are a response to immigration patterns in Britain and hence cover the 
supply aspect of Norris' theory as this is a response to changes in public demand (Norris 
2005: 24). Due to these changes being made by UKIP, there has been a response by other 
parties (in particular the Conservatives) in order to gain back some of the supporters lost as a 
result of partisan dealignment because of UKIP's policies. Xenophobia is often a response to 
tension and hostility at social boundaries and drawing upon the example of Luton this can 
clearly be seen as a large percentage of the area's population are ethnic minorities ,which has 
caused the White British population to react and turn to right-wing parties and street 
movements such as UKIP and the English Defence League respectively as they are retaliating 
to these supposed changes (Baumgartl and Favell 1995:  6).  
 There is a direct causal link between xenophobia and racism, with nationalism often 
also being a step in between the two. A strong example of this is a quote from UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage where he states that he would feel uncomfortable if a Romanian family moved 
in next door to him and when asked if he would also feel uncomfortable if this was a German 
family he replied 'I think you know the difference. We want an immigration policy that is not 
just based on controlling not just quantity but quality' (Nigel Farage 2014). Here it can be 
inferred that Farage is afraid of a group of people that he does not have a lot of knowledge 
about and therefore turns to what seems like a racist statement as he does not know what else 
to do as well as the fact that he sees Romanian people as being of inferior 'quality'. Hence as 
he is the leader of the political party, his views transcend throughout all of the party and its 
followers. It can be seen that an increase in immigration, asylum seekers and refugees has 
caused public frustration and it is in these situations that right-wing parties thrive in political 
success (Norris 2005: 11). This immigration issue has led to a gradual and cumulative 
influence of long-term cultural trends causing a vast change (Norris 2005: 21). This can also 
be seen through political polarisation in Britain.  
 
5.6 Polarisation 
 
 Polarisation first became known by ‘realist writers’ that 'wrote about the structure of 
the international system, the impact of military alliances on war and peace, and the balance 
of power, Vasquez, Choucri North etc.' (Maiese and Norlen 2003).  The definition of 
polarisation is something that causes a division between groups of individuals due to 
difference of opinion.  For example, UKIP often polarises the nation because of its policies 
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and its viewpoint of what Britain should look like. It’s a process that can often lead to 
conflicts and in the political sense it could be used to see ,which side of the left/right political 
spectrum you belong to.  
 With that being said the causality for polarisation can be due to a number of reasons 
such as political, sociological and psychological and it is something that is influenced 
because of 'escalation' and ‘vice versa’ (Maiese and Norlen 2003). For example, when 
debates escalate, there is a rise in tension and usually a struggle to tarnish the other party’s 
reputation and to prove to the audience that their party is the better choice. This was seen 
when the deputy prime minister Nick Clegg’s party, the Liberal Democrats suffered a 
humiliating defeat against the UKIP at the EP elections. He challenged Nigel Farage to two 
debates to appeal to the voters of why it is best for the UK to stay in the EU, however he was 
outwitted and received less support as a result. (Oxam 2014). 
 Escalation can also intensify polarisation as it moves groups towards or further apart 
from their political spectrum, where supporters have to choose if they are ‘with or against 
them’ and this leads them to blame the opposing party for all that is wrong with society and 
make a decision of whose side they favour (Maiese and Norlen 2003). When situations such 
as this occur it tends to leave supporters confused and also encourages them to leave the party 
to vote elsewhere where their concerns matter; occasionally, these voters are left behind and 
as soon as a party shows any interest in their ideas, they show support and commitment 
towards them. This could be a strong reason as to why UKIP is gaining votes as it is 
appealing to those that have been ignored and who feel that the mainstream parties are not 
voicing the people's concerns.  
 This leads us to believe that UKIP willingly allows polarisation to occur and actively 
uses this to provoke the public into thinking about the nation's wellbeing; but also to tackle 
the different debates regarding this security set by other parties. As polarisation can affect 
parties negatively and positively, UKIP has undergone both but has remained resilient. They 
strive for political dominance and are keen to demonstrate to all those who misjudged them 
that with time people become more accepting and therefore they are optimistic about when 
this, will lead them into power.  
 
5.8 UKIP as the creator of public demand 
 
 Public demand can be seen in modern day Britain, and the aforementioned causal 
factors all contribute to the rise of UKIP and create the opportunity the effectively obtain a 
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populist strategy and supply this demand. But UKIP is not only the supplier of public 
demand, they also function and thrive as the creator of demand, and successfully shape 
opinion and viewpoint of British citizens. UKIP and its leader, Nigel Farage, has created and 
increased both xenophobia, polarisation and thereby created the very demand they benefit 
from at the end. Public statements in speeches, interviews, and newspaper heading are some 
of the means used by UKIP when creating demand. 
 On the 23rd of October a radical Islamist shot and killed a Canadian soldier in 
Ottawa. In a column in the Independent, Nigel Farage argues that 'it could just as easily 
happen in the streets of London' (Independent 2014). This can be seen as a tactic meant to 
scare the public in order to have a harder approach against Islam in Britain. UKIP is also 
applying the scare-tactic when it comes to the EU and the integration of Bulgaria and 
Romania in the Schengen Treaty. Here UKIP leader, Nigel Farage is holding a speech in the 
European Parliament talking about '(…) the opening of the doors to 29 million poor people 
from Romania and Bulgaria' (UKIP 2014). In this example he is making it sound as if every 
single citizen from Bulgaria and Romania is both poor and is looking to go to Britain at first 
possible moment. The rhetoric used by Nigel Farage in this speech is not only factually 
wrong but is contributing to the negative notions UKIP has about the European Union. One 
could argue that in the cases mentioned, UKIP is directly creating demand through their 
rhetoric by framing issues in an angle useful to UKIP’s own agenda. 
 Statements from other politicians can also be used to create polarisation while also 
questioning the very politician. In this case Farage reacted to Cameron’s speech on 
immigration and said 'Here is the Prime Minister using this word 'control' and totally 
deceiving the British people yet again. Because one thing is true: he has absolutely zero 
control over the situation. He cannot control immigration from the EU and has revealingly 
dropped his suggestions of a cap or an emergency brake on numbers coming in' (UKIP 
2014). This is a great example of polarising the public or in this case as it was posted on 
UKIP’s webpage polarising UKIP supporters, as Farage is clearly undermining Cameron’s 
ability to maintain border control, he is appealing to UKIP followers to prove that 
mainstream politicians are not good at keeping their promises and also if UKIP is elected at 
the general elections this would be amongst the urgent matters to be dealt with. In Nigel 
Farage’s own column in The Independent, he again points to the Ottawa shootings, a heading 
writes: 'Nigel Farage on the Ottawa shooting: It could just as easily happen on the streets of 
London '(The Independent 2014). Here Farage clearly creates and stimulates the already 
occurring xenophobia. Nigel Farage is not only a populist charismatic leader, but also an 
  
42 
active asset in the process of creating the xenophobia he himself in benefiting from. It is clear 
that the demand is not only created by social issues but also by UKIP themselves.  
  
5.9 How UKIP has supplied public demand 
 
 In search of supplying public opinion UKIP has obtained heavy populist strategies, 
something that is very common to right-wing parties (Norris 2005: 211) This section covers a 
few political issues where UKIP succeed in supplying demand; the EU, immigration and 
foreign aid. Focus in the section is on how UKIP is supplying public demand on the 
previously mentioned issues. This will be answered on the basis of Pippa Norris’ theory on 
supply and demand. Polls from YouGov will be used to determine public demand on certain 
issues and UKIP policies, statements and visions from their website and debate videos will be 
used as their supply. The populist strategy used by UKIP is a political style where parties 
benefit from their ‘people’ by becoming influential and the ‘people’ benefit from them by 
getting what they want (Mondon and Galanopoulos 2014). Today there is a distinction 
between right-wing and left-wing populism. Right-wing populism is exclusionary where left-
wing populism is inclusionary, which means that the first mentioned is xenophobic, 
authoritarian and social conservative, while the latter considers the wealthier people in a 
society as enemies of other's prosperity and happiness (Gilbert 2014).    
 A general sense of mistrust between politicians of traditional parties is present in the 
UK. The issue of the political elite being out of touch with reality seems to have struck the 
British population. According to a YouGov poll, 63% of the people interpret Prime Minister, 
David Cameron as looking down on ordinary people (YouGov 2014). On the opposite side of 
the scale Nigel Farage receives the public opinion as the person who is seen by most people 
as not looking down on people, and the person seen by the least as someone who does.  
 As mentioned earlier in chapter 5, UKIP has radical visions for British immigration 
policy. This seems to be a policy fitting in with the public demand. This can be seen from a 
YouGov poll conducted on October 30th – 31st, which says that 28% of the British people 
believe Nigel Farage would be the best leader in terms of 'making the right decisions on 
immigration' (YouGov 2014). This is equivalent to the number of people thinking Miliband 
and Cameron would be the best combined. In the same poll one has to keep in mind though, 
that 27% believe none of the politicians just mentioned, including Nick Clegg from the 
Liberal Democrats, would be better than the other.       
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 'Page and Shapiro, suggests that mass public opinion shifts fairly rationally and 
predictably in response to these sorts of social and political developments' (Norris 2005: 22). 
This statement can be used to provide evidence to back up various UKIP policies as they feel 
that they are only responding to what the people want. A survey provided by NatCen Social 
Research British Social Attitudes revealed that the majority of the British population believe 
that immigrants coming from other European Nations should not be given access to the 
welfare state in the first three years of them living there (Guardian 2014). This is because a 
large proportion of the population are under the assumption that immigrants are only in the 
country to seek benefits (Guardian 2014). It is no surprise then that UKIP would offer a 
solution to this on growing problem by creating more restrictions for immigrants who wish to 
live permanently in the UK. This consists of learning the English language, becoming 
employed, finding appropriate housing and approving an NHS insurance.  
 On the issue of immigration, among others, the political supply is affecting public 
demand. This has to be understood in the context that parties can frame problems in the 
media in a way that makes people offended or interested in the given subject. When 
discussing xenophobia we have an ideal example of just that. 
 On the policy area of the EU, UKIP has the right policy concerning public demand. 
UKIP is the only party with a very clear voice on the issue of leaving the Union. Parties such 
as the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have promised referendums, but this does not 
say, that they want to leave. In fact the Liberal Democrats might be the party ,which is the 
most pro-EU. On this issue, a YouGov poll from October 27th-28th shows that 44% of the 
British people want to leave the EU against 35% who want to stay. These numbers support 
the notion of supplying public demand since UKIP are explicitly Eurosceptic. The data in the 
YouGov poll is varying a lot though, as the predictions for the potential outcome is changing 
almost from day to day. 
 According to Norris’ theory, the centre of the zone of acquiescence can change 
through what she describes as 'shocks'. A shock can for instance be 'public reactions to major 
changes in government policies' (Norris 2005: 21). As an example of this, UKIP is framing 
the EU as governing Britain. 'UKIP believes in Britain becoming a democratic, self-
governing country once again. This can only be achieved by getting our nation out of the 
European Union and reasserting the sovereignty of Parliament' (UKIP 2014). Whether a 
major change is happening or not, UKIP has been successful on getting the message of 
Britain being under control of the EU across. On their website under 'free speech and 
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democracy' they state 'Only UKIP will return self-government to the British people' (UKIP 
2014). 
 Another issue where UKIP seem to supply public demand is on foreign aid. There has 
been a discussion on whether Britain should send money out of the country or keep the 
capital within British borders. Part of the discussion is taking place over sending foreign aid 
to Argentina, a member of the G20. This is according to an article in daily express, ,which 
says 'The UK has handed the South American country £225million out of our foreign aid 
budget over the past 20 years' (express 2014). The title of the article is  'Outrage as 
Argentina milks millions out of UK foreign aid budget' and on this very issue UKIP says they 
want to 'Make cuts to foreign aid that are real and rigorous.' (UKIP 2014) UKIP seek to   
'(…) cut the foreign aid budget by £9bn pa, prioritising disaster relief and schemes ,which 
provide water and inoculation against preventable diseases' (UKIP 2014). It is clear that 
UKIP is aiming to put domestic issues ahead of foreign, and at no point on their website are 
they mentioning positive aspects of foreign aid.    
 
5.10 UKIP's leader - Nigel Farage 
 
 Nigel Farage (born 3 April 1964) has been the leader of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party since November 2010 having also had a stint at this position from 
September 2006 to November 2009. He has also been a member of the Conservative Party 
until 1992 when the Maastricht Treaty was signed and UKIP was formed. He left due to the 
Conservative's standpoint on the EU, which contradicted his Eurosceptic views. 
 According to Gilbert (2014) a charismatic and idiosyncratic leader is a key 
characteristic for a party such as UKIP. Nigel Farage is often believed to be one of the most 
charismatic political leaders in Britain. In his attempt to perform right-wing populism, Farage 
aims to describe himself as an ordinary man with traditional British values. 'So is it any 
wonder that Ms Thornberry, Mr. Miliband, and indeed Mr. Cameron have no idea about the 
real lives of real people?' (Farage 2014). This implies that he wants to be portrayed as 
someone who is aware of the everyday issues of your average citizen.  
 Since UKIP is a right-wing party, it is obvious that their political style follows the 
right-winged populism. Left-wing populism ought to be easier to prosecute and popularise 
than right-wing populism, but both UKIP and their oppositions have proved the opposite of 
that (Gilbert 2014). David Cameron and Ed Miliband have both been weak in exercising left-
wing populism or sometimes they might have an extremely short-lived character (Gilbert, 
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2014). They do not possess Farage’s charismatic character and his ability to portray himself 
as an ordinary man. When asked about the party’s success in Rochester’s election Farage 
answered 'The key to UKIP’s victory in Rochester? We listened to people' (Farage 2014). He 
claims that Cameron, Miliband and Thornberry have no idea about ordinary people’s 
everyday life, which is why he had been knocking on people’s doors himself and listening to 
their concerns. Furthermore Farage is perceived as a man 'in touch with ordinary people, and 
a person who 'stands up for ordinary people' (YouGov 2014). Farage is very successful in 
creating his own image. His actions create proximity and makes the voter feel that he is 
reliable. He is reaching out to people’s feelings by showing them compassion and concern for 
their needs. Farage cites Reckless from his speech 'You remain my boss don’t make me forget 
it' (Farage 2014). By this quote Farage refers to himself as a servant for the people, ,which is 
another way of showing the people that he cares about them (Farage 2014). Farage’s 
charismatic character has helped him with gaining popularity resulting in six in ten voters 
think he is doing well (YouGov 2014). Statistics made by YouGov shows that Farage is 
gaining more popularity, where 61 % of the public says 'he is doing his job well', and the 
rates of those who think the contrary has fallen from 30 % in July 2014 to 26 % in October 
the same year. The difference between those who like him and those who don’t is increasing 
(YouGov 2014).  
 UKIP has shown signs, which are typical for populist movement. They are reaching 
out to people’s hearts and triggering their love for the country, by creating a shared identity 
of beery white Englishness that would make them unite and create proximity with one 
another.  
 In brief, the purpose of this chapter has been to analyse several aspects we, as a group, 
maintain to have been instrumental in the recent rise in support for UKIP. The political 
disaffection and dealignment provided us with evidence that UKIP is 'stealing' voters from 
both the Conservatives and Labour. In addition, the Eurosceptic dimensions revealed that 
UKIP is attracting people due to its want to leave the EU; these factors have undoubtedly 
contributed to its increase in popularity. Although it was not established ,which of 
immigration, multiculturalism and social inequality was most effective in what has led to 
UKIP’s support, we believe that with the help of xenophobia and polarisation, we have been 
successful in answering our second sub-question. Seeing as immigration is a rising epidemic 
in Britain, it has proven itself to be a main factor in what motivates people to vote for UKIP. 
As UKIP is regarded as a populist party, we have found certain evidence to support our 
hypothesis that populism has been working towards creating extra popularity for the party. 
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Throughout our analysis chapter, we have convinced the reader that UKIP uses these 
components to both gain further support and also maintain its currently positive reputation. 
All these reasons have helped us answer our overall research question of ‘What are the main 
factors leading to the rise in popularity of the UK Independence Party’. 
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Chapter 6 - Discussion:  
European Parliament Elections in Britain 
 
 As seen in the past elections both for the House of Commons and the European 
Parliament, UKIP has risen. However, the rise in popularity has been far greater in the 
European elections than in national elections. Our fourth and final sub-question aims to 
uncover 'Why has UKIP been far more successful in European Parliament elections than in 
national elections and polls?' 
 This chapter will include a brief summary of the EP election and how it differs from 
the national British election. This is important since the voting system constrains the 
opportunities for parties. Moreover, we will look into how these differences affect UKIP and 
what other factors contribute to the fact that the party has particularly gained in popularity in 
EP elections.  
 In the election for the European Parliament it is up to the member states to decide how 
to elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Therefore, there are different 
procedures within the different countries. Britain has a proportional electoral system; ‘This 
gives larger and smaller political parties the chance to send their representatives to the 
European Parliament in line with the number of votes they receive’ (europarl 2014). The 
British procedure for dividing their 73 MEPs is built on the D’Hondt Model (europarl 2014). 
This is a method whereby the number of MEPs are decided in rounds though calculation. The 
process of each round is that the biggest party receives an MEP and then their votes are 
divided by the number of MEPs plus one (europarl 2014). Since Britain has 73 seats in the 
European Parliament and there is no set threshold, the limit for getting exactly one seat is 
1.4% of the votes.   
 In 2009 UKIP secured 16.5% of the votes for the EP election in Britain and 
established itself as a party worth noting on the European scene (Guardian 2014). However, 
its success did not spill over to the national election a year later. UKIP gained 3.1% of the 
votes and zero members of parliament (BBC News 2013). The 2009 EP election, UKIP was 
established as a force in British politics, and as we now know UKIP has risen to 17% in 
recent polls. Robert Ford (2012) argues that success in second-number elections, like an EP 
election, can create an effect on national elections. This could be the process at play. UKIP’s 
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obvious successes in 2009 and 2012 now seem to culminate in support for the party in the 
national elections, as it now stands to gain 17% of the votes and already has two new MPs.  
 The differences in voting systems also offer some explanation to our sub-question. As 
opposed to the British majoritarian voting system the aforementioned EP voting system offers 
different opportunities for smaller parties to gain influence through the percentage of voters 
needed. This can be seen throughout, with UKIP as the ideal example, as a party who won no 
seats in the 2010 national Election, then receives 27.5% of the votes in the EP election 
(europedecides 2014). In the case of Britain, a party can gain 3.1% of the votes but that does 
not necessarily correlate in to seats because of the FPTP system.  
 Besides the different voting system, a change in voter mentality is also occurring 
when second-number election are being held. According to various scholars people diverge 
more from their habitual support when voting in a second-number election (Norris 2005: 25), 
(Reif & Schmitt 1980: cited in Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012). It can further be argued that 
this can be caused by the perception of the EP election (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012). The 
fact that an EP election does not 'result in any process of government formation, voters are 
less concerned with the strategic outcomes of their vote' (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2008: 9.Cited 
in: Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012). Hence voters do not see any direct outcome of the 
election and are therefore more likely to diverge, or perhaps not vote at all. In 2012's EP 
election the voting turnout was 34.2% (Appendix A Figure 1), that could point towards the 
fact that only people who feel strongly about the subject showed up to vote. Only people with 
truly Eurosceptic viewpoints show up and vote, and as we have earlier discovered the number 
of Eurosceptic Brits by far exceeds the number of people voting for UKIP. Ford et al. offers 
some explanation concerning this dilemma. He suggests voters may use second-number 
elections in an expressive tactical manner, whereby they use their vote ‘to warn their own 
party to mend its ways’ (Heath et al. 1999: 407.Cited in: Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012). 
Through this, people express their Eurosceptic beliefs by voting for UKIP even though they 
would not support them in a national election. Their overall disaffection with the EU is thus 
the only reason they vote for UKIP. Since neither the Conservatives, Labour or Liberal 
Democrats offer any clear Eurosceptic viewpoints, UKIP is simply the main option left.  
 Ford et al. suggest that we split up UKIP voters into two sections (Ford, Goodwin and 
Cutts 2012). We have the strategic voter who typically votes for UKIP because of its 
Eurosceptic views, but would not vote for them in a national election. Their second group of 
supporter are the core voters. People actually voting for UKIP on the basis of its main party 
policy. For these people, xenophobia is a major factor, and a factor that translates from 
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national elections to the EP elections (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012: 26). The xenophobic 
factors we examined earlier in this project are still relevant in the EP election. I.e. the fact that 
90% of UKIP voters believe immigration to have a negative influence on Britain, even 
though immigrants economically contribute more to Britain than they collect in welfare 
benefits (YouGov 2014). Furthermore we found that only a very small sample of the 58% 
that said 'immigration has had a negative influence on our daily life' has had any personal 
experience with their daily lives being blighted by immigrants (YouGov 2014 see chapter 
5.3). UKIP itself is also contributing to this xenophobia. Leader Nigel Farage has on various 
occasions said in the context of Romania and Bulgaria joining the EU: 'we are opening the 
door to 29 million poor people from Romania and Bulgaria' (Appendix B). By making this 
controversial statement he is clearly trying to create some sort of xenophobic image for the 
party. The fact that there are not 29 million citizens in Romania and Bulgaria, and would not 
want to immigrate to Britain, are somewhat irrelevant since Farage’s aim is to create 
xenophobia.  
 UKIP’s position in the EP is clearly different than in the British House of Commons, 
they are a powerhouse in European politics because of the difference in voting system and 
voter mentality. The D’Hondt system used at EP elections allowed UKIP to succeed in the 
first place, and grow on the European scene. As we have now learned the EP election 
functioned as a catalyst for its national success. The change in voter mentality also aided 
UKIP in the EP elections. The strategic voters abandoning their habitual support, and voting 
for UKIP because of its Eurosceptic believes are the main difference between EP elections 
and national election. Even though UKIP’s core voters still carry over from national election 
due to the increased xenophobia, the strategic voter seems to be the defining difference.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
  
 In answering our research question, 'What are the main factors leading to the rise in 
popularity of the UK Independence Party?’ we familiarised ourselves with UKIP and its 
structure and policies. Our reasoning for choosing UKIP is that they have been attracting a lot 
of attention in the British political arena due to their distinct policies on issues such as 
immigration and the EU. In order to answer our research question we looked at various 
theories that could be useful, however, Pippa Norris' theory on right wing radicalism stood 
out for us. However we felt the need to elaborate further and include some other theoretical 
concepts. Our methodology consisted of a series of quantitative and qualitative data ,which 
we used as evidence as to why UKIP have been so popular as of late.  
 We found that all of the concepts and factors used throughout are relevant however 
we found xenophobia and Euroscepticism to be the two main causes for people to vote for 
UKIP. We had anticipated that Euroscepticism would be one of these factors as it is heavily 
interlinked throughout their populist policies and their view on the EU, however from our 
findings we induced that xenophobia was equally relevant as the fear of people from Eastern 
Europe and Asia has caused the British public to retaliate, in this case by voting for UKIP. 
UKIP has been very successful in responding to the Eurosceptic tendency in the British 
population, a clear no to EU voice offers something that no other relevant political party in 
Britain can offer. Xenophobia offers some explanation as to why Euroscepticism thrives in 
Britain. According to our analysis xenophobic trends are occurring in Britain and creating 
hostility towards EU and immigration.  
 Though Euroscepticism and xenophobia are two major factors leading to the rise of 
UKIP, we found through our analysis that all of our mentioned points are interconnected one 
way or another. The political disaffection and partisan dealignment occurring in UK politics 
is not only due to Euroscepticism but also a result of the struggle experienced by established 
political parties. This struggle has created the opportunity for UKIP to rise as it has. UKIP's 
success is based largely on their ability to make populist policies promoting cultural 
protectionism. The need for this Cultural Protectionism has been produced by the demand 
side factors mentioned in chapter 5.4 - 5.6. Looking at UKIP as a creator of public demand, 
we can highlight the fact that they are not only looking to supply popular demand but can 
also create it through scaremongering. Together with their ability to create demand stands 
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their ability to adapt populist strategies when creating polices. Offering what the population 
longs for has contributed greatly to their rise. 
As can be seen throughout, this project is heavily based around Pippa Norris' theory 
which looks at the rise of radical right-wing parties in Europe. Ten years after this book has 
been published we can see that this theory is still relevant in relation to UKIP, in particular 
when looking at how wide public demand has a causal link to a response in the form of the 
political supply provided by UKIP, which has also been limited by the electoral rules of the 
United Kingdom. Furthermore, the 9 point model identified in chapter 3 has also been key in 
our understanding of the recent success of UKIP as many of the points mentioned are 
relevant and can be incorporated into our understanding. 
 Despite the vast relevance of Norris' theory in the case of UKIP, other factors and 
concepts were necessary to fully understand how and why the party gained such an ample 
support over a fairly short period of time. Having identified immigration and the EU as the 
key points highlighted in UKIP's policies, we used concepts such as polarisation and 
xenophobia to further our understanding as these can be used separately but also link into 
Norris' theory of supply and demand as they can be seen as a cause for demand. Our use of 
empirical data consisted of various literatures that we further described in the methods 
chapter. Although our main focus was on Pippa Norris’s theory on radical right wing parties 
as she wrote on similar party in the UK, the BNP and her theory was the most applicable to 
establishing our research question. We also used other theorists such as, Robert Ford and 
Matthew Goodwin as useful sources of information as they covered UKIP in much depth and 
their arguments especially applied for our project. Current articles published from outlets 
were also used to help us gain an understanding of the existing political atmosphere between 
the differing parties. Our statistical material was mainly provided by YouGov amongst others 
and this helped us to identify public opinion about UKIP. 
 Overall, we believe that our research question has been answered as we reflect back 
on the chapters of this project. We have touched upon the majority of the areas contribute to 
this rise of UKIP and our finalised conclusion is that all the factors we have listed play an 
instrumental role in the recent bolstering support of UKIP. 
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